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1.1  Introduction 
 
The classical model of contract law1 was premised upon an adversarial ethic 
where contractual parties legitimately sought to maximise their own interests.2  
Under this static model,3 ‘contract law simply set ground rules for self-maximising 
private ordering.’4  As a corollary of the underlying ideology of liberal 
individualism,5 with the fundamental aim of protection of the individual as an 
autonomous subject,6 (or in a market context ‘market individualism’),7 contractual 
performance and the exercise of contractual rights and discretions was virtually 
unrestrained by considerations of the reasonable expectations or the legitimate 
interests of the contractual counter-party.8  It is these reasonable expectations or 
                                                 
∗  Based on a paper presented at the Second Biennial Conference on the Law of 
Obligations, University of Melbourne, 15-16 July 2004.  Research for this article forms 
part of the author’s SJD studies at the Queensland University of Technology. 
•  B Econ, LLB (Hons) (Qld), LLM (QUT); Solicitor, Queensland; Lecturer, Faculty of Law, 
Queensland University of Technology.  I am grateful for the insights of an anonymous 
referee. 
1  A model consistent with, and reflective of, the economic theory of laissez-faire: A F 
Mason, ‘Contract, Good Faith and Equitable Standards in Fair Dealing’ (2000) 116 LQR 
66, 70 (being an article based on Sir Anthony Mason’s Cambridge Lecture: ‘Contract and 
its Relationship with Equitable Standards and the Doctrine of Good Faith’, The 
Cambridge Lectures, 1993 (8 July 1993)). 
2  Acting in the manner of a straightforward maximiser, that is a person who attends only to 
their own interests: D Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (1986) as referred to by R 
Brownsword, ‘Positive, Negative, Neutral: the Reception of Good Faith in English 
Contract Law’ in R Brownsword, N Hird and G Howells (eds), Good Faith in Contract: 
Concept and Context (1999) 13, 32. 
3  Classical contract law focused almost exclusively on the static point of contract formation: 
M Eisenberg, ‘Why There is no Law of Relational Contracts’ (2000) 94 Northwestern 
University Law Review 805, 807. 
4  J M Feinman, ‘Relational Contract Theory in Context’ (2000) 94 Northwestern University 
Law Review, 737, 738. 
5  Bigwood refers to contract law’s embracement of individualism as its dominant informing 
ideology: R Bigwood, ‘Conscience and the Liberal Conception of Contract: Observing 
Basic Distinctions Part II’ (2000) 16 JCL 191, 203.  An economic justification for 
individualism is the notion of the invisible hand transforming what appears to be 
selfishness into public benefit: Anthony J Duggan, ‘Is Equity Efficient?’ (1997) 113 LQR 
601, 603. 
6  R Bigwood, ‘Conscience and the Liberal Conception of Contract: Observing Basic 
Distinctions Part 1’ (2000) 16 JCL 1, 19. 
7  A model of self-interested dealers converging on a market-place, making their one-off 
exchanges, and going their separate ways: I R Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contract’ 
(1974) 47 S Cal LR 691. 
8  Subject only to an observance of the like freedom and equal opportunity of all others to 
pursue their own self-interest: Bigwood, above n 6, 20. 
 2
legitimate interests that the common law obligation of good faith in contractual 
performance and enforcement may operate to protect. 
 
In Australia, the twin public policy themes of freedom of contract and the 
desirability of certainty9 of contract10 in commercial dealings have been 
commonly repeated by those who seek to retard the development of any 
contractual obligation of good faith which may be based on competing policy 
considerations.  Members of the judiciary11 and academic commentators alike 
have been concerned about the impact of the implied obligation of good faith on 
the sanctity of freedom of contract and the potential uncertainty12 that may be 
introduced into commercial arrangements negotiated at arms length by 
commercial entities. 
 
The following quotation typifies the type of judicial concern traditionally raised: 
 
why should commercial entities each with strong bargaining power, not be permitted to 
drive the best bargain they can, provided that they act within the law?…..The courts 
should not be too eager to interfere in the commercial conduct of the parties, especially 
where the parties are all wealthy, experienced, commercial entities able to attend to their 
own interests.13 
 
Similar academic concerns have been expressed: 
 
Good faith… is an imperfect translation of an ethical standard into legal ideology and 
legal rules.  However much it might stimulate research or encourage inquiry into theories 
underlying contract law, its appropriate home is the university where it can perform these 
functions without wreaking practical mischief.14 
 
1.2 A changing of the guard 
 
                                                 
9  One commentator has noted that the appeal to the virtue of certainty was the crucial 
gateway signalling the presence of communication between the practical world of 
business and the closed doctrinal system of law: H Collins, ‘The Sanctimony of Contract’ 
in R Rawlings (ed), Law, Society and Economy, Centenary Essays for the London School 
of Economics and Political Science 1895-1995 (1997) 63, 66. 
10  Of course, the desirability of certainty of contract may be questioned.  ‘It is said by some, 
and disputed by others, that businessmen prefer certainty to justice, and like to know 
where they stand.’: Lord Justice Staughton, ‘Good Faith and Fairness in Commercial 
Contract Law’ (1994) 7 JCL 193, 194. 
11  The potential for the good faith doctrine to undermine certainty of contract law was raised 
in, amongst other decisions, Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 
NSWLR 582 and Service Station Association Ltd v Berg Bennett & Associates Pty Ltd 
(1993) 117 ALR 393. 
12  It has been observed that certainty can become a mantra, a euphemism for the sanctity 
of contracts: Collins, above n 9, 67. 
13  Rogers J in GSA Group Ltd v Siebe PLC (1993) 30 NSWLR 573, 579. 
14  M Bridge, ‘Does Anglo-Canadian Contract Law Need a Doctrine of Good Faith?’ (1984) 9 
Can Bus LJ 385, 412. 
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In more recent times, the validity of some of these traditional concerns has been 
openly questioned.  Sir Anthony Mason, taking up two points made by Kelly J in 
Gateway Realty Ltd v Arton Holdings Ltd (No. 3),15has queried: 
 
why are not good faith and fair dealing superior objects to obsessive insistence on total 
clarity and certainty in contract?  And why is emphasis on the need for good faith and fair 
dealing not likely to lead to the resolution of business disputes?16 
 
As identified by Gleeson CJ, changing social attitudes also herald the need for a 
retreat from legal formalism: 
 
The demands of justice, as seen through modern eyes, are much less likely to be met by 
formal and inflexible rules which treat hard cases with the dismissiveness sometimes 
manifested in earlier times.  The citizens of the late 20th century have an attitude towards 
all forms of authority which is questioning, demanding and self-assertive.  They seem to 
place less value upon predictability than former generations….17 
 
Consistent with these developments, an obligation of good faith in commercial 
contractual performance and enforcement is clearly emerging in Australia.  In his 
seminal judgment in Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public 
Works18 (‘Renard’), Priestley JA observed that the implication of a duty of good 
faith and fair dealings is a reflection of ‘community expectations of contractual 
behaviour’.19  Since Renard20 there have been a number of Australian decisions 
that have canvassed the possibility of a common law obligation of good faith in 
contractual performance and enforcement.21  
                                                 
15  (1991) 106 Novia Scotia Rep (2d) 180, 198. 
16  Mason, above n 1, 89. 
17  A M Gleeson, ‘Individualised Justice-The Holy Grail’ (1995) 69 ALJ 421, 430. 
18  (1992) 26 NSWLR 234. 
19  Ibid 268.  A similar approach is implicit in the judgment of Finn J in Hughes Aircraft 
Systems International v Air Services (1997) 146 ALR 1. 
20  (1992) 26 NSWLR 234. 
21  See, eg, Advance Fitness v Bondi Diggers [1999] NSWSC 264; Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v 
Transfield Pty Ltd (1999) 153 FLR 236; Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 
NSWLR 349; Apple Communications v Optus Mobile [2001] NSWSC 635; Asia Pacific 
Resources Pty Ltd v Forestry Tasmania (Unreported, Tas Sup Ct, Full Ct, Cox CJ, 
Underwood and Wright JJ, 4 September 1997); Asia Television Ltd v Yau’s Entertainment 
Pty Ltd (2000) 48 IPR 283; [2000] FCA 254; Australian Co-operative Foods Ltd v Norco 
Co-operative Ltd (1999) 46 NSWLR 267; Australis Media Holdings Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp 
Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104; Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2002] 
WASC 286; Bamco Villa Pty Ltd v Montedeen Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 192; Blackler v Felpure 
Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 958; Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2001] WASC 
128; (2001) 24 WAR 382; Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2002] WASCA 
94; Christopher John De Pasquale v The Australian Chess Federation Incorporation (AO 
1325) [2000] ACTSC 94; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Renstell Nominees Pty Ltd 
[2001] VSC 167; Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Pty Ltd v Cassegrain 
[2002] NSWSC 965; Cubic Transportation Systems Inc v State of New South Wales 
[2002] NSWSC 656; Dalcon Constructions Pty Ltd v State Housing Commission (1998) 
14 BCLC 477; Dickson Property Management Services Pty Ltd v Centro Property 
Management (Vic) Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1742 (2000) 180 ALR 485; Dorrough v Bank of 
Melbourne (Unreported, Fed Ct of Aust, Cooper J, 29 September 1995); Easts Van 
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As it impacts on the performance and enforcement of commercial contracts, 
while there remain members of the Australian judiciary who clearly favour the 
traditional approach, underpinned by an adversarial model and public policy 
concerns for freedom and certainty of contract, concerns of this nature seem less 
important to those who see the need for an infusion of good faith into Australian 
commercial life.22  In this regard, it is fair to say that a common law obligation of 
good faith in contractual performance and enforcement is emerging from the 
decisions of courts lower in the Australian judicial hierarchy. 
 
To adequately delineate (or reject) the common law obligation of good faith, the 
High Court23 will need to confront a number of separate issues.  Some of these 
                                                                                                                                                 
Villages Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the National Parks and Wildlife Act [2001] 
NSWSC 559; (2001) Aust Contract R 90-132; Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd v Anaconda 
Nickel Ltd [2001] VSC 502; Elfic Ltd v Macks [2000] QSC 18; Etna v Arif [1999] 2 VR 353; 
Far Horizons Pty Ltd and Rodney Hackett v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310; 
Forklift Engineering v Powerlift [2000] VSC 443; Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty Ltd v 
Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd (1999) ATPR 41-703; Gemmell Power Farming Co Ltd v Nies 
(1935) 35 SR (NSW) 469; Gibson v Parkes District Hospital (1991) 26 NSWLR 9; 
Howtrac Rentals Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors (NZ) Ltd [2000] VSC 415; Hudson 
Resources Ltd v Australian Diatomite Mining Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 314; Hughes Aircraft 
Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1; Hughes Bros Pty Ltd v 
Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney (1993) 31 NSWLR 
91; Hurley v McDonald’s Australia Ltd (2000) ATPR 41-471; K & S Freighters Pty Ltd v 
Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1325; Lay v Alliswell Pty Ltd (2002) V Conv R 
54-651; LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 886; 
GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd (2003) 128 FCR 1; 
News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 135 ALR 33; NT Power 
Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2001) 184 ALR 481; Overlook v Foxtel 
(2002) Aust Contracts Rep 90-143; Presmist Pty Ltd v Turner Corporation Pty Ltd (1992) 
30 NSWLR 478; Radly Corp Ltd v Suncorp Metway Ltd [2001] VSC 272; Royal Botanic 
Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council (2002) 186 ALR 289; Saxby 
Bridge Mortgages Pty Ltd v Saxby Bridge Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 433; Service Station 
Association Ltd v Berg Bennett & Associates Pty Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 393; Shorrlong Pty 
Ltd v Northern Territory Housing Commission [1999] NTSC 140; Softplay v Perpetual 
[2002] NSWSC 1059; South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd 
[2000] FCA 1541; (2000) 177 ALR 661; State Bank of New South Wales Ltd v 
Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd (2001) 51 NSWLR 399; State of New South Wales v 
Banabelle Electrical Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 178; Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Placer 
(Granny Smith) Pty Ltd (2000) 16 BCL 130; Walker v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 2) 
(2001) 39 ACSR 557; Wenzel v Australian Stock Exchange Ltd [2002] FCAFC 400; WMC 
Resources Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 489. 
22  The former Chief Justice of Australia, Sir Anthony Mason, commented (extrajudicially) 
that the quality of ‘Australian commercial life could only profit from an infusion of good 
faith’: Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Foreword’ (1989) UNSWLJ 1, 2-3. 
23  A decision of the High Court is still awaited.  In Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust 
v South Sydney City Council [2002] HCA 5; (2002) 186 ALR 289 Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, 
McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ noted [40] that whilst the issues respecting the 
existence and scope of a ‘good faith’ doctrine are important, it was an inappropriate 
occasion to consider them.  Justice Kirby [89] and Justice Callinan [156] also did not 
consider it necessary to address these issues. 
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issues have already been well canvassed by academic commentators.24  
However, there is one significant issue that has attracted relatively little 
comment.  To date, a number of Australian courts (lower in the judicial hierarchy) 
have been prepared to hold directly, tacitly accept or assume (without making a 
final determination)25 that good faith is implied, as a matter of law, in the 
performance and enforcement of a very broad class of contract, namely, 
commercial contracts per se.  This broad approach is demonstrated by certain 
decisions of the Federal Court,26 the New South Wales Court of Appeal,27 the 
Supreme Courts of Victoria28 and Western Australia29 and has crept into 
pleadings in commercial matters in Queensland.30 
 
For the purposes of this article, the potential implications of this broad approach 
to good faith may be examined by the use of two case studies, both involving 
contractual opportunism (and a consequent consideration of motive). 
 
2.1  Case study 1 
 
Two companies enter a 60 day contract for the sale and purchase of commercial 
realty.  The contract expressly provides that time is of the essence.  After having 
granted a number of extensions (on each occasion the essentiality of the time 
provision having been affirmed) the contract is finally due for settlement some 
120 days later.  Unfortunately, problems associated with obtaining finance will 
preclude the buyer from settling on the due date but it is established that the 
                                                 
24  See, eg, J M Paterson, ‘Good Faith in Commercial Contracts? A Franchising Case Study’ 
(2001) 29(4) ABLR 270; E Webb, ‘The Scope of the Implied Duty of Good Faith-Lessons 
from Commercial Retail Tenancy Cases’ (2001) 9 APLJ 1; J W Carter and A Stewart, 
‘Interpretation, Good Faith and the ‘True Meaning’ of Contracts: The Royal Botanic 
Decision’, (2002) 18 JCL 1; T M Carlin, ‘The Rise (and Fall) of Implied Duties of Good 
Faith in Contractual Performance in Australia’, (2002) 25(1) UNSW Law Journal 99; E 
Peden, Good Faith in the Performance of Contracts (2003); J W Carter and Elizabeth 
Peden, ‘Good Faith in Australian Contract Law’ (2003) 19 JCL 1. 
25  The approach of the Supreme Court of Western Australia Full Court in Central Exchange 
Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2002] WASCA 94, [13], [55] and also the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal in Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15, 
[191]. 
26  In Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 903, 
Finkelstein J opined that a term of good faith will be implied in perhaps all commercial 
contracts [34].  Also, South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd 
[2000] FCA 1541, [393-394]. 
27  Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella [1998] 44 NSWLR 349, 369; Burger King Corp v Hungry 
Jack’s Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187 [159]; Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd 
[2004] NSWCA 15, [191]. 
28  Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonalds Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310, [120]; Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia v Renstell Nominees Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 167; Varangian v OFM Capital 
Limited [2003] VSC 444; Cathedral Place Pty Ltd v Hyatt Australia Ltd [2003] VSC 385. 
29  Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2002] WASCA 94. 
30  Elfic Ltd v Macks [2000] QSC 18, [109]; Laurelmont Pty Ltd v Stockdale & Leggo 
(Queensland) Pty Ltd [2001] QCA 212; Cook’s Construction Pty Ltd v Stork ICM Australia 
Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 66, [20]. 
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buyer will be in a position to settle the next day.31  As the buyer has paid a 
significant deposit and the property market has been steadily rising, the seller 
elects to terminate the contract and forfeit the deposit confident in the 
expectation that the property will be resold for a larger amount. 
 
Conventional analysis (without good faith considerations) would proceed as 
follows: 
 
2.2  Without Good Faith 
 
On the assumption that this commercial contract was negotiated at arm’s length 
by parties on an equal footing, it is unlikely that the contractual relationship will 
be construed as giving rise to fiduciary duties.32  On existing High Court authority, 
the only protection that may be available for the defaulting buyer under the land 
sale contract would be equitable relief against forfeiture or, more correctly, the 
possibility of specific performance being available as a remedy notwithstanding 
the termination of the contract for breach of the essential time provision.33  
However, consistent with Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi34 and other well 
settled authority the buyer’s prospects of success would appear remote as it is 
not against conscience (on these facts)35 for the seller to terminate.36 
 
Adopting conventional analysis, the seller’s motive (to generate profit at the 
expense of the buyer), in exercising the contractual right of termination for breach 
of the essential time provision, is of no relevance.  Would this result change if a 
dash of good faith is added to the contractual mix? 
 
2.3  With good faith 
 
As previously noted, from slow beginnings,37 an obligation of good faith in 
contractual performance and enforcement is emerging in Australian judicial 
decisions.38    Unfortunately, this judicial recognition of an obligation of good faith 
in contractual performance and enforcement has occurred in a manner that has 
                                                 
31  Factual circumstances similar to those prevailing in Tanwar Enterprises v Cauchi [2003] 
HCA 57;201 ALR 359 (where a one day delay was occasioned by foreign exchange 
control authorities). 
32  Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41. 
33  Strict doctrinal rules dictate that relief against forfeiture concerns the forfeiture of 
proprietary interests: G J Tolhurst and J W Carter, ‘Relief Against Forfeiture in the High 
Court of Australia’, (2004) 20 JCL 1, 8. 
34  [2003] HCA 57; 201 ALR 359. 
35  The default was not caused by fraud, accident, mistake or surprise such as to render it 
unconscionable or inequitable for the seller to rely on its legal rights.  The default could 
not be described as an unforeseen event, even though unintended and undesired. 
36  Cf Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406; Stern v McArthur (1988) 165 CLR 489. 
37  From the seminal judgment of Priestley JA in Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v 
Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234. 
38  As previously noted, a decision of the High Court is still awaited. 
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been described as ‘tortured’39 both in its application of precedent and its 
application of relevant legal tests.  Not only is judicial division apparent but 
statements of public policy principles have been scant.  There is relatively little 
express discussion of the theoretical perspective that may, as a matter of policy, 
support the implication of a good faith obligation.  For this reason, unresolved 
issues are legion.40  For the present time, the only observation that can be made 
with any degree of certainty is that the obligation of good faith in contractual 
performance and enforcement takes the form of an implied contractual term41 
with the implication commonly being made, as a matter of law,42 in commercial 
contracts.43 
The contract (in case study 1) can clearly be characterized as a commercial 
contract.44  If the generally prevailing lower court view was adopted by the High 
Court of Australia, an obligation of good faith will be implied, as a matter of law, 
as an incident of this contract meaning the seller would need to demonstrate (if 
challenged) that the contractual right of termination was exercised in good faith.  
If the seller’s motivation in electing to terminate was purely opportunistic, this 
                                                 
39  Carlin, above n 24, 122. 
40  A few examples will suffice: Is the good faith obligation tantamount to an obligation to act 
reasonably in contractual performance? (An approach of this sort would be contrary to 
the traditional common law approach.  The traditional view at common law is that there is 
no requirement that contractual rights be exercised in a reasonable way: White & Carter 
(Councils) Ltd v McGregor [1962] AC 413.)  Should good faith be equated to a fiduciary 
standard? (This possibility has raised concerns for certain commentators: J W Carter and 
A Stewart, ‘Interpretation, Good Faith and the ‘True Meaning’ of Contracts: The Royal 
Botanic Decision’, (2002) 18 JCL 1, 13.)  Does an obligation of good faith apply to the 
exercise of contractual rights in the same manner as it may apply to the exercise of a 
contractual discretion?  What correlation is there (if any) between good faith and 
unconscionability? (Some seek to equate the notions of unconscionability and good faith.  
Refer to J Stapleton, ‘Good Faith in Private Law’, [1999] CLP 1 and E Webb, ‘The Scope 
of the Implied Duty of Good Faith-Lessons from Commercial Retail Tenancy Cases’ 
(2001) 9 APLJ 1.)  Can there be an implied term requiring good faith contractual 
performance and enforcement if there is an inconsistent express contractual term? (On 
general principles, it would be expected that primacy would be accorded to the express 
term but contrast the approach of the majority in Johnstone v Bloomsbury Health 
Authority [1991] 2 WLR 1362.  In the Australian context refer to Australian Mutual 
Provident Society v 400 St Kilda Road Pty Ltd [1991] 2 VR 417.)  What is the effect of a 
‘sole discretion’ clause?  Is it possible to successfully exclude (by way of an express 
contractual provision) an obligation of good faith in contractual performance and 
enforcement? 
41  Notwithstanding that this approach has been trenchantly criticized by certain 
commentators: see, eg, Carter and Peden, above n 24. 
42  Although not uniformly, in a small number of reported Australian decisions the implication 
as been made, or treated, as a matter of fact, for example: Advance Fitness v Bondi 
Diggers [1999] NSWSC 264; Dalcon Constructions Pty Ltd v State Housing Commission 
(1998) 14 BCLC 477. 
43  In Burger King Corporation v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187 the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal (Sheller, Beazley and Stein JJA) observed [164] that there was an 
increasing acceptance that a term of good faith was to be implied as a matter of law, 
which approach was considered to be correct. 
44  Tanwar Enterprises v Cauchi [2003] HCA 57; 201 ALR 359 [113] (Kirby J). 
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may be problematic.45  In the context of a contract where a number of extensions 
have already been granted, a further demonstrated delay of one day only would 
not appear onerous46 particularly given a seller’s entitlement to seek interest on 
the balance purchase price for the period of the delay. 
In the absence of unconscionable conduct by the seller, this potential fetter on 
the seller’s rights would obviously not sit comfortably with well established 
principles applicable to land sale contracts.47  Where time is of the essence, a 
buyer is taken to understand that a failure to settle on the due date will make the 
deposit liable to forfeiture.48  Further, the possibility that relief may be available at 
common law (based upon an implied obligation of good faith), in circumstances 
where, on traditional analysis, relief would not be available in equity, may be 
characterized by some as a paradox.49 
 
3.1  Case study 2 
 
A local manufacturing company (the ‘manufacturer’) enters a 5 year 
distributorship contract with a second company that will act as the sole distributor 
(the ‘distributor’) of the manufacturer’s products.  The distributor buys the 
manufacturer’s product and on sells the product on its own behalf.  Under the 
terms of the contract the product is to be paid for within 7 days of supply and the 
contract expressly provides that time is of the essence.  After two years of 
operation the distribution rights have proven to be very lucrative and the 
manufacturer would like to terminate the contract to gain these valuable rights for 
itself (and this can be established).  Unfortunately, on the day payment is due for 
the most recent supply of goods it becomes apparent that problems associated 
with obtaining finance will preclude the distributor from making payment but it is 
established that the distributor will be in a position to settle the next day.  The 
manufacturer elects to terminate the contract for breach of the condition. 
 
3.2  Without good faith 
                                                 
45  Stack refers to a line of real estate cases, mostly from Ontario that has held that a 
contractual entitlement to walk away from a contract of sale cannot be exercised in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner.  In these cases a clause such as a ‘time of the essence’ 
clause was sought to be used to escape at the last minute from a contract that, for one 
reason or another, became unprofitable.  Stack goes on to note that where a community 
based ‘reasonable’ standard was applied the party was denied the benefit of the 
contractual entitlement.  However, in decisions where an ‘interpretive’ standard (a 
standard based on the contractual regime and the reasonable expectations arising from 
it) was used, a very different conclusion was reached: D Stack, ‘The Two Standards of 
Good Faith in Canadian Contract Law’, (1999) 62 Saskatchewan Law Review 201, 205-
210. 
46  Tolhurst and Carter make a similar observation: above n 33, 11. 
47  Tanwar Enterprises v Cauchi [2003] HCA 57;201 ALR 359 being the latest decision in a 
line of authority. 
48  Consistent with the function of a deposit being an earnest to bind the bargain: Howe v 
Smith (1884) 27 Ch D 89, 101-102; Wilson v Kingsgate Mining Industries Pty Ltd [1973] 2 
NSWLR 713, 735. 
49  J W Carter and Elizabeth Peden, above n 24, 16. 
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Once again, in the context of a commercial contract negotiated at arm’s length by 
parties on equal footing, without an obligation of good faith our distributor is 
clearly in a difficult predicament and may have little recourse against what some 
may see as a cynical resort50 to black letter rights under the contract.51 
 
3.3  With good faith 
If generally prevailing lower court authority is followed, this contract would, again, 
be characterized as a commercial contract with an attendant obligation of good 
faith.  Again, this would mean that the manufacturer would need to demonstrate 
(if challenged) that the contractual right of termination was exercised in good faith 
which will be difficult if the facts establish that the sole motivating factor was the 
extraneous purpose52 of usurping the distributor’s rights.53 
 
4.1  Contractual context 
 
Adopting the prevailing good faith model, the results in both case studies may 
well be the same.  Subject to demonstrating a lack of good faith,54 a remedy may 
                                                 
50  In seeking to regain control of the distribution rights, the manufacturer’s conduct may be 
described, like that of Burger King Corp in Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd 
[2001] NSWCA 187, as ‘commercially reprehensible’. [424] 
51  To adopt wording (descriptive of a lack of good faith) as used by Barrett J in Overlook v 
Foxtel [2002] NSWSC 17, [83]. 
52  To adopt (in part) the language of Mandie J in Bamco Villa Pty Ltd v Montedeen Pty Ltd; 
Delta Car Rentals Aust Pty Ltd v Bamco Villa Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 192, [162] Cf Apple 
Communications v Optus Mobile [2001] NSWSC 635. 
53  This would tend to suggest that the contractual right was exercised in bad faith (utilizing 
Professor Summers’ excluder analysis: R S Summers, ‘Good Faith in General Contract 
Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code’, (1968) 54 Va L Rev 
195). 
54  It is not my intention in this paper to consider the meaning and content of the good faith 
obligation.  There is a wealth of literature concerning the meaning of the term ‘good faith’, 
particularly in the American context.  Reference may be made to the following material: M 
G Bridge, Does Anglo-Canadian Contract Law need a Doctrine of Good Faith?’ (1984) 9 
Canadian BLJ 385; R Brownsword, N Hird and G Howells (eds), Good Faith in Contract: 
Concept and Context (1999); R Brownsword, ‘Two Concepts of Good Faith’ (1994) 7 JCL 
197; S J Burton, ‘Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good 
Faith’ (1980) 94 Harvard Law Review 369; J W Carter and M P Furmston, ‘Good Faith 
and Fairness in the Negotiation of Contracts’ (1994) 8 JCL (part 1); (1994) 8 JCL 93 (part 
2); E Allan Farnsworth, ‘Good Faith in Contractual Performance’ in J Beatson and D 
Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) 153; E Allan Farnsworth, 
‘Ten Questions About Good Faith and Fair Dealing in United States Contract Law’ [2002] 
AMPLA Yearbook 1; H K Lucke, ‘Good Faith and Contractual Performance’ in P D Finn 
(ed), Essays on Contract (1987); E Maloney, ‘Contracts and the Concept of Good Faith’ 
(1993) 23 ACLN 32; A F Mason, ‘Contract, Good Faith and Equitable Standards in Fair 
Dealing’ (2000) 116 LQR 66; J M Paterson, ‘Good Faith in Commercial Contracts? A 
Franchising Case Study’ (2001) 29(4) ABLR 270; E Peden, Good Faith in the 
Performance of Contracts (2003); D Stack, ‘The Two Standards of Good Faith in 
Canadian Contract Law’ (1999) 62 Saskatchewan Law Review 201; R S Summers, 
‘Good faith in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
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be available for the buyer in case study 1 and the distributor in case study 2.  The 
question is whether it is appropriate, for the motive of both the seller and the 
manufacturer (as the parties exercising contractual rights in case study one and 
two respectively) to be challenged?  Should these situations be capable of being 
distinguished?  In other words, assuming good faith is to operate in a certain 
class (or category) of contract,55 is the class of ‘commercial contract’ an 
appropriate good faith filter or does the filter need further refinement?  Do the 
case studies suggest that commercial contracts are sufficiently homogenous 
such that a good faith obligation should be implied, as a matter of law, in all 
contracts falling within this class?  Before answering these questions, it is 
necessary to briefly consider the operation of contractual terms implied as a 
matter of law. 
 
4.2  Implication as a matter of law in a certain class of contract 
 
Adopting the generally prevailing view, terms implied as a matter of law56 are 
contractual terms which the law implies as a necessary incident of a definable 
class of contractual relationship.57  In these circumstances, the very nature of a 
contract (in the particular class) means the implied term will operate regardless of 
the intentions of the contractual parties.58 
 
The first requirement is that there be a definable class of contractual 
relationship.59  Unfortunately, outside certain recognized classes,60 the cases 
provide little guidance concerning what other classes of contract should attract 
the operation of implied contractual terms.61  Depending on whether the class of 
contract is defined generally or, more specifically, the courts may be accused of 
over- or under-inclusion.62  The obvious consequence associated with the 
adoption of a broad class of contract, such as ‘commercial contracts’, is that in all 
future cases, involving a contract that may be classed as a commercial contract, 
the implication of a contractual term of good faith will be made automatically.  As 
                                                                                                                                                 
Code’ (1968) 54 Virginia L Rev 195; R S Summers, ‘The General Duty of Good Faith-its 
Recognition and Conceptualisation’ (1982) Cornell Law Review 810; SM Waddams, 
‘Good Faith, Unconscionability and Reasonable Expectations’ (1995) 9 JCL 55; D Yates, 
‘Two Concepts of Good Faith’ (1995) 8 JCL 145. 
55  The assumption being made at lower court level. 
56  Sometimes described as default rules. 
57  Australis Media Holdings Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104,122-
123. 
58  Being based on imputed intention: Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 103. 
59  The classes of contracts in which the law will imply terms is not closed: Castlemaine 
Tooheys Ltd v Carlton & United Breweries Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 468, 487 (Hope JA). 
60  Landlord and tenant, employer and employee and contracts of bailment. 
61  The criteria by which contracts are to be classified for the purpose of implying terms by 
law have received only passing attention by judges or commentators: M Bryan and M P 
Ellinghaus, ‘Fault Lines in the Law of Obligations: Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall 
Australia Ltd’ (2000) 22 (4) Syd LR 636, 650. 
62  A Phang, ‘Implied Terms in English Law-Some Recent Developments’ [1993] JBL 242, 
247. 
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exemplified by the case studies, this would mean, amongst other things, that the 
motive of a party terminating a commercial contract could be universally 
challenged.63   
 
The second requirement64 is to satisfy the test of necessity.65  In this context,66 
‘necessity’ means ‘unless such a term be implied, the enjoyment of the rights 
conferred by the contract would or could be rendered nugatory, worthless, or, 
perhaps, be seriously undermined.’67  Once again, significant judicial discussion 
of this requirement of necessity (and the policy reasons68 that may support the 
implication of a contractual term as a matter of law) being satisfied across the 
whole range of commercial contracts, is not apparent.  The fact that these two 
requirements have tended to be overlooked in the cases where good faith has 
been implied as a matter of law is an indication that the good faith filter may need 
refinement.  Aspects of relational contract theory may suggest the means by 
which the filter could be refined. 
 
5.1 Good faith-a relational notion?69 
 
Perhaps the most recognized contribution of Ian Macneil’s work in contract law70 
was his assertion that legally enforceable contracts exist on a continuum (or 
spectrum) ranging from highly discrete relations at one end of the continuum to 
highly relational (or highly intertwined) relations at the other end.71  The 
continuum is a reflection of the importance of the relations between the 
contractual parties.  Macneil provides a hypothetical example of a highly discrete 
transaction:72 the cash purchase of gasoline at a station on the New Jersey 
                                                 
63  Waddams is of the view that an overriding duty of good faith is not sufficiently objective 
because it leads to consideration of the subjective motives of the parties: S M Waddams, 
‘Good Faith, Unconscionability and Reasonable Expectations’ (1995) 9 JCL 55, 63-64. 
64  Phang refers to this two stage test for a term implied by law: Phang, above n 62, 245-
246. 
65  Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10, 30 (Mason CJ). 
66  By contrast to the test of necessity in the context of terms implied in fact the criterion of 
necessity for terms implied in law is much broader as it involves policy factors. 
67  Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410, 450. 
68  Policy reasons have been expressly articulated in the past, see, for example, Lister v 
Romford Ice [1957] AC 555, 576-579; Simonius Vischer & Co Holt & Thompson [1979] 2 
NSWLR 322, 348.  In the specific context of an implied obligation of good faith, Finn J 
has expressly acknowledged that considerations of public policy can and do have an 
overt role to play: Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 
117 ALR 1, 39. 
69  Macneil suggested in 1978 that good faith was a relational notion: I R Macneil, 
‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical 
and Relational Contract Law’, (1978) 72 Northwestern University Law Review 854, 890. 
70  As acknowledged by Macneil himself: I R Macneil, ‘Relational Contract Theory: 
Challenges and Queries’ (2000) 94 Northwestern University Law Review 877, 894. 
71  This spectrum of contractual behaviour is sometimes treated as relational contract theory 
in itself, although even as a theory it is only an adjunct to essential contract theory: ibid. 
72  Macneil acknowledged that that like the ends of rainbows, the ends of the spectrum are 
mythical.  For this reason, a wholly discrete transaction can only be a theoretical 
example: Macneil, ibid 896. 
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turnpike by someone rarely traveling the road.73  The classical model of contract 
law could well be based on this type of discrete (or spot)74 transaction,75 
premised upon an adversarial ethic where contractual parties legitimately seek to 
maximise their own interests. 
 
By contrast, relational contracts are often contracts governing business 
relationships that exist and evolve over long periods of time.76  Commercial 
contracts that are typically regarded as being relational are distributorships, 
agency relationships, partnerships, joint ventures, long-term leases and franchise 
agreements.77  Relational contracts of this type are obviously increasingly 
common and economically important.78  A common feature of these contracts 
(unlike spot or discrete contracts) is that it is difficult to optimally allocate all risks 
at the time of contracting due to the possibility of unforeseen contingencies and 
also the common desire of one contractual party to retain a high degree of 
control.  The success, or otherwise, of the relationship may well be dependent on 
a level of future co-operation in both performance and planning. The formation of 
a relational contract is marked by expectations of loyalty and interdependence 
which then becomes the basis for the parties rational economic planning.79  As 
both parties reasonably expect80 that mutual cooperation will promote their 
economic interests,81 a party to this type of contract does not (rationally) intend to 
assume the risk of opportunistic behaviour,82 as may be the case in the 
traditional adversarial context.83 
                                                 
73  Macneil, above n 69, 857. 
74  “Classical contract law is based on certain implicit paradigm cases, the most common of 
which is the contract for an identified commodity between two strangers operating in a 
perfect spot market”: Bobux Marketing Ltd v Raynor Marketing Ltd [2001] NZCA 348 [33] 
(Thomas J). 
75  Many would argue that the fundamental flaw of the classical conception of contractual 
law was that it was based on a false premise namely that most contracts are discrete 
rather than discrete contracts being unusual: Refer for example to Melvin A Eisenberg, 
‘Relational Contracts’ in J Beatson and D Friedmann (eds), Good Faith in Contract Law 
(1995), 297. 
76  Although relational contracts need not be long-term contracts: Bobux Marketing Ltd v 
Raynor Marketing Ltd [2001] NZCA 348 [43] (Thomas J). 
77  Bobux Marketing Ltd v Raynor Marketing Ltd [2001] NZCA 348, [42]. 
78  In Australia the franchise sector alone has an annual turnover of more than $80 billion, 
and employs over 600,000 people.  This sector also generates over $290 million in 
annual export income for Australia (figures quoted by Cheryl Scott, Austrade’s franchise 
and service export industry 
specialist:http://www.findlaw.com.au/news/default.asp?task=read&id=19243&site=LE ). 
79  Bobux Marketing Ltd v Raynor Marketing Ltd [2001] NZCA 348 [43] (Thomas J) (citing a 
number of commentators for this proposition). 
80  The type of reasonable expectation expressly recognised by Wilson J in Hospital 
Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41, 117 when noting 
that every sole distributorship contract would induce in both parties a reasonable 
expectation of mutual benefit accruing from the ‘best efforts’ of the distributor. 
81  The parties having a mutual interest in the successful performance of their agreement: 
Bobux Marketing Ltd v Raynor Marketing Ltd [2001] NZCA 348 [42] (Thomas J). 
82  Hadfield has suggested an interpretation of ‘good faith’ as fidelity to an implicit obligation 
not to use discretion opportunistically: ’The Second Wave of Law and Economic: 
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Macneil’s continuum is consistent with empirical studies that have repeatedly 
confirmed that relational norms of honesty, trust and flexibility form the 
foundation of a successful long-term commercial contractual relationship.84  From 
the pioneering work of Professor Stewart Macaulay in the United States in the 
1960’s,85 Beale and Dugdale in the United Kingdom in the 1970’s86 and more 
recently the work of Arrighetti, Bachmann and Deakin in the United Kingdom and 
Europe in the mid-1990’s87 it has been demonstrated that commercial dealings of 
this nature are characterized by these self-imposed norms of behaviour 
underpinned by a rationale of self-interest and profit-maximisation.88   
 
Also consistent with Macneil’s continuum, these empirical studies are consistent 
with relational dealings being only one paradigm-not all commercial contracting is 
relational.89  In other words, relational concepts like trust and fair dealing are not 
of general application and do not necessarily carry through to all business 
transactions.90  The relational world of business contracting must be 
distinguished from the non-relational (discrete) world of business contracting.91  
In a survey of 182 corporations of various sizes in all parts of the United States, 
Weintraub92 also confirmed this distinction between relational and discrete 
commercial contracts.93   
 
5.2 A narrower gauge? 
 
When the vexed issue of good faith finally falls for determination by the High 
Court, the challenge will be to develop a model that will provide a platform for 
coherent future development.  Ideally, the model should be capable of securing a 
number of economic and pragmatic objectives.  The model should provide 
contractual parties with greater security and more flexibility in the manner in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Learning to Surf’ in M Richardson and G Hadfield, The Second Wave of Law and 
Economics (1999), 60 as referred to by J M Paterson, ‘Good Faith in Commercial 
Contracts? A Franchising Case Study’ (2001) 29 ABLR 270, 290. 
83  With a relational contract there may also be a significant expectation of altruistic 
behaviour: Macneil, above n 69, 905. 
84  Dr Vivien Goldwasser and Tony Ciro, ‘Standards of Behaviour in Commercial 
Contracting’ (2002) 30 ABLR 369, 369. 
85  S Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ (1963) 28 Am 
Soc Rev 55. 
86  H Beale and T Dugdale, ‘Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of 
Contractual Remedies’ (1975) 2 British Journal of Law and Society 45. 
87  A Arrighetti, R Bachmann and S Deakin, ‘Contract Law, Social Norms and Inter-firm 
Cooperation’ (1997) 21 Cambridge J Economics 171. 
88  Also demonstrating a clear gap between classical contract theory and the operational 
world of contractual relations: Goldwasser and Ciro, above n 84, 369. 
89  Ibid 370. 
90  Ibid 371. 
91  Ibid 393. 
92  R J Weintraub, ‘A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy’ [1992] Wis L Rev 1, 19. 
93  As referred to by Goldwasser and Ciro, above n 84, 373. 
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which they are prepared to do business.94  The model should reduce transaction 
costs by reducing self-protective ‘defensive expenditures’95 and ‘exhaustive 
contract planning.’96  The model should deter contractual opportunism (where 
inappropriate),97 allow the optimisation of the parties’ mutual interests and 
encourage contracting.98  In considering these requirements, a key issue will be: 
when is a cooperative (rather than an adversarial) model appropriate and in what 
category of contract? 
 
Is there is a model capable of achieving these objectives?  One possibility99 may 
be for an obligation of good faith in contractual performance and enforcement to 
be implied, as a matter of law, in a narrower class, being commercial contracts 
that are relational in nature.  This suggested model recognizes that the traditional 
adversarial contractual model is inappropriate for relational commercial contracts 
but still leaves scope for the operation of the traditional adversarial model100 for 
commercial contracts that are not relational in nature.  Despite suggestions to the 
contrary,101 it is submitted that it is unnecessary to imply an obligation of good 
faith, as a matter of law, in all commercial contracts.  The adoption of such an 
approach fails to heed the diverse nature of the commercial contracting 
environment.102 
                                                 
94  R Brownsword, ‘Positive, Negative, Neutral: the Reception of Good Faith in English 
Contract Law’ in R Brownsword, N Hird and G Howells (eds), Good Faith in Contract: 
Concept and Context (1999) 13, 31. 
95  T Wilhelmsson, ‘Good Faith and the Duty of Disclosure in Commercial Contracting-The 
Nordic Experience’ in R Brownsword, N Hird and G Howells (eds), Good Faith in 
Contract: Concept and Context (1999) 165, 178. 
96  A J H Loke, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Implied Duties of Good Faith’ [1999] JBL 538, 557. 
97  R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed, 1998) 103.  In this context, the observation 
that implied contractual terms are in reality low cost methods of deterring costly 
opportunistic behaviour may be well made: A M Johnson, Jnr. ‘Correctly Interpreting 
Long-Term Leases Pursuant to Modern Contract Law: Towards a Theory of Relational 
Leases’ (1988) 74 Va L Rev 751 (Footnote 135). 
98  Professor Smillie suggests a functional touchstone for the purpose of the law of contract 
is the positive encouragement of contracting.  In his view, this is why the classical 
common law rules placed such a high value on certainty and predictability: J Smillie, ‘Is 
Security of Contract Worth Pursuing? Reflections on the Function of Contract Law’ (2000) 
16 JCL 148, 154. 
99  Clearly there a number of possibilities.  Peden advocates the use of good faith as a 
constructional tool rather than reliance being placed on implied terms (E Peden, Good 
Faith in the Performance of Contracts (2003)).  However, this approach did not seem to 
find favour with the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile 
Innovations Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15, [206] and may be considered (rightly or wrongly) to 
be inconsistent with mainstream Australian authority.  A further alternative would be for 
the obligation of good faith in contractual performance and enforcement to be made 
universally as a matter of law: The approach of NC Seddon and MP Ellinghaus, Cheshire 
& Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Aust ed, 2002) paras 10.41ff. 
100  Where contractual parties can legitimately seek to maximize their own interests, without 
any restraint on self-interested dealings. 
101  Overlook v Foxtel [2002] NSWSC 17; (2002) Aust Contracts Rep 90-143 and other 
decisions previously referred to in footnotes 4 to 8 inclusive. 
102  In certain commercial transactions (for example, the commodities world of forward 
trading) the concept of a co-operative search for a jointly maximized profit is an 
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By contrast, the suggested model has the flexibility to accommodate multifarious 
commercial activity.  Adopting this approach, the commercial contractual context 
will be relevant, rather than viewing commercial contracts as an undifferentiated 
lump to be accorded the same contractual treatment regardless of context.103  
For commercial contracts that are not relational in nature, the suggested model 
would enable the parties to continue to pursue their own interests in the 
unfettered manner that has historically been seen to be advantageous.104   
5.3 Application  
Adopting the suggested model, the contractual context in case studies one and 
two may be clearly distinguished.  A commercial land sale contract, as in case 
study 1, is not relational in nature.  There is no cooperative or mutual endeavour 
to promote economic interests.  Rather, each party actively pursues their own 
interests with the purchaser alone bearing the risk of default in timely payment.  
In this commercial context an obligation of good faith in the enforcement of the 
contract appears unduly intrusive. 
Unlike a land sale contract, a sole distributorship contract, as in case study 2, is a 
commercial contract that would undoubtedly be characterized as relational105 in 
nature.106  Consistent with aspects of relational contract theory (and the available 
empirical evidence), a party to this type of contract does not (rationally) intend to 
assume the risk of opportunistic behaviour of the type clearly exhibited by the 
manufacturer in situation two.  As a potential fetter on the exercise of the 
manufacturer’s contractual right of termination (due to the court’s ability to 
consider contractual motive), the implied obligation of good faith seems apposite 
in this more restricted commercial context. 
                                                                                                                                                 
anathema to the participant’s involvement in a ‘zero sum game’: M Bridge, ‘Good Faith in 
Commercial Contracts’, in R Brownsword, N Hird and G Howells (eds), Good Faith in 
Contract: Concept and Context (1999) 152. 
103  Bridge refers to the heterogeneity of commercial activity and the corresponding need to 
avoid treating commercial law as an undifferentiated lump to be accorded the same 
prescriptive treatment: Bridge, ibid, 145. 
104  The English approach to good faith has been underpinned by an acute awareness of the 
need for commercial certainty particularly in international financial markets, so important 
to the economy of the United Kingdom: Bridge, ibid 144.  This approach may be viewed 
as being consistent with the importance that United Kingdom judges and lawyers attach 
to London’s position as a centre of international commerce and finance: Mason, above n 
1, 83.  Sir Anthony Mason has also noted (elsewhere) that certainty of contract has not 
been as all-consuming in Australia due to being ‘neither an industrial power nor a 
maritime nation’: Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Changing the Law in a Changing Society’ (1993) 
67 ALJ 568, 573. 
105  In Bobux Marketing Ltd v Raynor Marketing Ltd [2001] NZCA 348, Thomas J held no 
doubt that a distributorship agreement for babies’ leather booties fell within the category 
of relational contracts [43]. 
106  The termination of such a long-term contract tends, to use the words of Ian Macneil, to be 
messily relational rather than cleanly transactional: Macneil, above n 69, 900. 
 16
5.4  Support for the narrower gauge 
 
As the available empirical evidence supports a distinction between relational and 
discrete commercial contracts, this may suggest the need to make the same 
distinction when selecting a class of commercial contract that will attract an 
implied obligation of good faith.107  Some explicit judicial recognition of the non-
homogenous nature of the commercial contracting environment is apparent in 
this context.  The Dymocks New Zealand franchise litigation (that made its way to 
the Privy Council in 2002) is a case in point.  At first instance, in the New Zealand 
High Court, Hammond J observed that a franchisor-franchisee relationship is 
more than a simple bilateral contract.  It is a relational contract in which a 
working, ongoing relationship is set up for the mutual benefit of both parties.108  
From an economic point of view, what was central was the joint maximization of 
economic benefits.  Both parties were to work in good faith to that end.109 
 
Adopting this expressly relational approach,110 Hammond J found that an 
obligation of good faith (and confidentiality) was implied in franchise agreements 
as part of New South Wales law.111  On appeal, the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal rejected the trial judge’s finding of an implied term.112  
 
When the matter reached the Privy Council,113 their lordships allowed the appeal 
on the basis that both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal were in error in 
determining that the franchisee had not repudiated their obligations under the 
franchise agreement.  Due to this finding it was unnecessary for the Privy Council 
to express a concluded view on the issue of good faith.  However, the very crux 
of the conclusion of repudiatory conduct was the recognition that franchise 
agreements are not ‘ordinary commercial contracts but contracts giving rise to 
long term mutual obligations in pursuance of what amounted in substance to a 
joint venture and therefore dependent upon coordinated action and 
cooperation.’114  This comment is clearly consistent with the non-homogenous 
                                                 
107  If contract law is to be better aligned with empirically demonstrated commercial reality. 
108  Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bilgola Enterprises Ltd (1999) 8 TCLR 
612, [236]. 
109  Id 
110  An approach that also found favour with one judge (Thomas J) of the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal in Bobux Marketing Ltd v Raynor Marketing Ltd [2001] NZCA 348 [33] although 
the remaining two judges (Keith and Blanchard JJ) expressly declined to comment on the 
issue of good faith performance [81]. 
111  The franchise agreements in question provided that the governing law was that of New 
South Wales. 
112  [2000] 3 NZLR 169 (Richardson P, Henry and Keith JJ).  It should be noted that this 
conclusion, that an obligation of good faith was not implied in a franchise agreement as 
part of New South Wales law, was reached before the decision of the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal in Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187. 
113  Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bilgola Enterprises Ltd [2002] UKPC 50. 
114  Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bilgola Enterprises Ltd [2002] UKPC 50, 
[63]. 
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nature of commercial contracts and the clear need to have regard to the 
commercial context.115  
 
In a similar vein, although refraining from expressing a concluded view on 
whether duty of good faith and fair dealing should be implied,116 is the approach 
of Finn J in GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty 
Ltd:117  
 
I consider this to be a case in which cogent grounds exist for making the implication 
sought.  I would simply note that the Sub-Contract was a long term relational one in 
which cooperation and trust were to be expected because of the back-to-back nature of 
the ADCNET contracts.118 
 
Real impetus for serious reconsideration of the appropriate class, has been 
provided by the recent decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal119 in 
Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovation Ltd.120  Mobile had been appointed by 
Vodafone as a sole or exclusive direct marketing agent under a long term Agent 
Service Provider (‘ASP’) contract.  Amongst other things, the questions arose 
whether Vodafone was under an implied obligation to act in good faith in 
exercising its powers under the ASP contract, specifically the power of 
determining target levels for the acquisition of subscribers.  Although the Court of 
Appeal was ultimately content to assume, expressly without deciding, that there 
was such an implied obligation,121 some extremely pertinent observations were 
made concerning the class of contracts carrying the implied term as a legal 
incident. 
 
In discussing the earlier decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in 
Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd,122 Giles J123 observed that this 
decision fell short of, indeed rejected, treating commercial contracts as a class of 
contracts carrying the implied term as a legal incident.124  Giles J then observed: 
 
                                                 
115  Similarly, in Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 
41, 117 the recognition (by Wilson J) that every sole distributorship contract would induce 
in both parties a reasonable expectation of mutual benefit accruing from the ‘best efforts’ 
of the distributor. 
116  Given an earlier finding on repudiation. 
117  [2003] FCA 50. 
118  GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 50, 
[921]. 
119  Giles, Sheller and Ipp JJA. 
120  [2004] NSWCA 15. 
121  Unless excluded by express provision or because inconsistent with the terms of the 
contract: Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15, [191]. 
122  [2001] NSWCA 187. 
123  Sheller and Ipp JJA concurring with the judgment delivered by Giles JA. 
124  Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15, [189]. 
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I do not think the law has yet gone so far as to say that commercial contracts are a class 
of contracts carrying the implied terms as a legal incident, and the width and 
indeterminacy of the class of contracts would make it a large step.125 (Emphasis added) 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The decision in Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovation Ltd126 is significant for 
two reasons.  First, the New South Wales Court of Appeal127 is clearly seeking to 
distance itself from any suggestion that Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty 
Ltd128 should be viewed as authority for the proposition that an implied obligation 
of good faith is a legal incident of all commercial contracts.  Secondly, the 
decision heralds the need for a careful consideration of contractual context when 
determining a class of contract that should attract the implied obligation at 
common law.129  
 
Given this apparent change of position by the New South Wales Court of Appeal, 
the platform has been laid for the adoption of a new class of contract, being a 
class that demonstrably satisfies the requirements for a contractual term to be 
implied, as a matter of law.  The case studies in this paper exemplify that the 
adoption of a narrower class, commercial contracts that are relational in nature 
rather than commercial contracts per se, would screen unmeritorious good faith 
claims130 and satisfy the test of necessity, that is, an objective of preventing 
contractual rights being rendered nugatory, worthless or seriously undermined.  
The available empirical evidence reinforces a distinction between discrete and 
relational commercial contracts.  It is only in relational commercial transactions 
that there is evidence of contractual parties having a reasonable expectation that 
certain business norms will prevail.  If good faith is concerned with protecting the 
reasonable expectations of contractual parties, this difference in the commercial 
contractual context should be reflected by the adoption of the suggested 
narrower class.  This, in turn, may serve to appease residuary concerns about 
the impact of an implied obligation of good faith on economic freedom.131  
 
In short, the express recognition of good faith as a relational concept offers a 
structured path forward for common law claims arising from commercial 
contracts. 
 
                                                 
125  Ibid, [191]. 
126  [2004] NSWCA 15. 
127  A court which has championed the good faith cause. 
128  [2001] NSWCA 187. 
129  To ensure the class selected is not too broad in its width or indeterminant. 
130  Courtesy of its narrower width. 
131  In Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council [2002] HCA 5; 
(2002) 186 ALR 289 Kirby J observed [89] that the suggested implied term of good faith 
appeared to be in conflict with fundamental notions of caveat emptor that are inherent 
(statute and equitable intervention apart) in common law conceptions of economic 
freedom. 
